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ABSTRACT
The European Retrieval Carrier (EURECA) was launched
on its first flight on the 31st July 1992 and retrieved on the
29th of June 1993. EURECA is characterised by several
new on-board features, most notably Packet telemetry, and
a partial implementation of packet telecommanding, the first
ESA packetised spacecraft. Today more than one year after
the retrieval the data from the EURECA mission has to a
large extent been analysed and we can present some of the
interesting results.
The primary groundstations were at Maspalomas in
the Canary Islands and Kourou at French Guinea.
During the deployment and retrieval phases contact
was maintained via the NASA Communications
Network and the STS.
At ESOC, operational data processing was carried out
on the Eureca Dedicated Computer System (EDCS)
that hosts the mission-configured Spacecraft Control
and Operations System (SCOS) (ref 2) and the
Eureca-Specific Software (ESS) applications.
This paper concentrates on the implementation and
operational experience with the EURECA Packet Telemetry
and Packet Telecommanding. We already discovered during
the design of the ground system that the use of packet
telemetry has major impact on the overall design and that
processing of packet telemetry may have significant effect
on the computer loading and sizing. During the mission a
number of problems were identified with the on-board
implementation resulting in very strange anomalous
behaviours. Many of these problems directly violated basic
assumptions for the design of the ground segment adding to
the strange behaviour. The paper shows that the design of
a telemetry packet system should be flexible enough to
allow a rapid configuration of the telemetry processing in
order to adapt it to the new situation in case of an on-board
failure. The experience gained with the EURECA mission
control should be used to improve ground systems for future
missions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The European Retrievable Carrier (Eureca) is a reusable
platform supplying power, cooling, ground communications
and data processing services to a variety of independently
operated payloads (ref 1). Fifteen experimental facilities are
carried to support more than fifty individual experiments.
The operational altitude was 500 Kin. The Operations
Control Centre (OCC) was at ESA's European Space
Operations Centre (ESOC) in Darmstadt, West Germany.
The Eureca-A1 mission has characteristics differing
quite considerably from those of missions hitherto
supported at ESOC. One of these is the use of Packet
Telemetry and Packet Commanding. EURECA was
the first ESA application of Packet Telemetry and
Commanding.
2. WHY PACKET TELEMETRY AND
COMMANDING FOR EURECA
Spacecraft previously and currently controlled from
ESOC all use a time-division multiplexed (TDM)
telemetry, in which fixed-size subframes are
generated and downlinked at constant rate. In the
simplest case a given parameter appears at a fixed
address in the subframe and this parameter reports the
value of some on-board physical quantity, sampled in
principle at the subframe rate. Many spacecraft make
rather more sophisticated use of TDM telemetry,
essentially because their operations and on-board
applications cannot live with the restrictions of fixed
sampling/fixed telemetry address. Thus innovations
have appeared such as switchable formats,
programmable formats and floating formats (this last
named being an ad hoc packetisation). These
sophistications illustrate a weakness of TDM
telemetry, namely its inflexibility of handling a
variety of on-board data sources, generating data at
temporally varying rates, possibly as determined by
an elaborate plan of instrument operations. The
traditional TDM approach of allocating fixed
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proportionsoftheavailablebandwidthtoeachsourcethen
becomesbothrestrictiveandwasteful.
Eurecais a re-usable spacecraft supporting a different
payload complement on each flight (15 instruments on the
first flight). It also has to be assumed that most instruments
are controlled with "unknown design" and that each
instrument would require on-board flexibility to cover
different mission phases and instrument modes. Packet
Telemetry provides powerful capabilities to satisfy variable
data rates and configurations, also providing abilities for late
definition and changes. With Packet Telemetry the source
can generate observational data when needed, hence the
occurrence pattern or rate may be selected according to the
phenomenon being observed. Packet telemetry provides
variable partitioning of dowulink avoiding unnecessary
loading of resources. Another important considerations was
that the packet telemetry is a standard where other options
would have required special development with no or little
reuse leading inevitable to higher cost in the long turn.
The Packet telemetry recommendation (ref 3) uses two
principal data structures, the source packet and the Transfer
Frame, source packets being multiplexed within transfer
frames. Each on-board source must label its data packets
using CCSDS defined headers, although no requirements on
the contained data are imposed. The transfer frames are of
fixed length, optimised for high-performance transfer to the
ground. The concept of Virtual Channels (VCs) also exists,
to allow separation between data of different priorities, for
example real-time data needed for operations and non
time-critical dump of science data stored on board. VCs are
identified at the transfer flame level. In the case of Eureca
there are two VCs, VC0 and VC1, to handle real time and
playback data respectively. Playback data is downlinked
from on-board bubble memory and will contain bulky
payload data as well as housekeeping data from the
out-contact periods.
The Eureca telecommanding system is an hybrid between
the older command standards (Ref 4) and the new Packet
command standard (Ref 5). The reason for this lies in the
way it has been implemented on board. Command decoders
using the old standard have been used as a basis, but the
extra services of the packet commanding have been built
into the on-board computer. Thus when the on-board
computer is nominally activated, the commanding system
acts like a packet command system, using a subset of COP
1 of the standard (ref 5) . If the OBC is off, the old
standard has to be used. This paper will only concentrate on
the experience in using the COP-1 Procotol.
NOTE: In this section, although the word COP-1 is used,
EURECA has only implemented a subset of the COP-1. The
EURECA terminology and services are not
completely compatible with the latest issue of the
CCSDS recommendation.
COP-1 is a closed-loop Telecommand Protocol that
utilises sequential ("go-back-n") retransmission
techniques to correct Telecommand Blocks that were
rejected by the spacecraft because of error. COP-1
allows Telecommand Blocks to be accepted by the
spacecraft only if they are received in strict sequential
order. This is controlled by the necessary presence of
a standard return data report in the telemetry
downlink, the Command Link Control Word
(CLCW). A timer is used to cause retransmission of
a Telecommand Block if the expected response is not
received, with a limit on the number of automatic
retransmissions allowed before the higher layer is
notified that there are problems in sending
Telecommand Blocks. The retransmis sion mechanism
ensures that:
No Telecommand Block is lost
No Telecommand Block is duplicated
No Telecommand Block is delivered out of
sequence
The COP-1 protocol has also an expedited service.
This service is used for exceptional spacecraft
communications. Typically, this service is required
for recovery in absence of telemetry downlink (i.e no
CLCW), or during unexpected situations requiring
tmimpaired access to the spacecraft data management
system.
3. THE GROUND CONTROL SYSTEM
The introduction of Packet Telemetry makes it
possible to define Packet Types, and for each of these
packet types to define a standard for the format and
presentation of data in the Packet Data Field. The
following packet types are defined for Eureca:
Housekeeping 1, Housekeeping 2, Time,
Acknowledge, Exception, Report, Acknowledge and
Private Packets. Housekeeping 1 (HK1) packets are
similar to the subframes of TDM systems, containing
snapshots of on-board parameters which can be
subjected to limit and other checks and displayed on
alphanumeric and graphic displays. The other packet
types are different and require specific processing,
thus making the processing system more complex.
One of the major changes going from a TDM to
Packet Telemetry system is the change to an event
driven system (packets arrive asynchronously, rather
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than at fixed format rates). This impacts both design and
computer loading.
The Architectural Design of the Eureca Dedicated Computer
System (EDCS) is based on a Telemetry Processing Chain
and a Telecommnding Chain. The Telemetry Processing
Chain consists of a Telemetry Receiver, Telemetry
Processing Task, Command Verifier, Filing and Display
Tasks (alphanumeric, graphical displays, report/exception
displays). The Telecommand Chain consists of the Manual
Commanding Stacks, Automatic Commanding Queues,
Command Verifier, Command Uplinker, Command Filing
Task, Display and Configuration Tasks. The Communication
between these individual tasks is based on the Buffer
Manager, a tasks responsible for passing Telemetry and
Command buffers around the system. Telemetry and
Command buffers are given to the Buffer Manager and
asked tasks are informed that a data buffer is available for
processing. The Buffer Manager does not pass around the
actual data buffers, only small mailbox messages are send
to the relevant tasks with a reference to the data buffer. This
architecture is very convenient for Packet Telemetry, the
Packets are distributed according to the packet type. If for
a mission other packet types are required, such architecture
makes it possible to setup a new task to process these new
packet types without disturbing the functionality of already
existing tasks.
As for a TDM spacecraft, the computer load on a packet
TM system is dominated by telemetry processing and
display support (neglecting any project specific
peculiarities). Commanding tasks account for only a small
fraction (3-5%) of the load. Two main considerations
distinguish the load characteristics of the ground computer
system supporting a packet telemetry Firstly, there will not
be one format, but a set of packets, of different lengths each
having different processing needs. Secondly, the packets are
generated asynchronously, not at a constant rate, so it is
essential to have a traffic model, which gives a fairly
realistic representation of average and peak packet rates. In
the case of Eureca, such models are needed for pass and
post pass activities, which are quite different. During
real-time processing (pass operations), the packet rate is
(worst case) 12Is. This generates a much higher load than
the rather low daily average data rate (2kbits/s) might lead
one to suppose. By contrast , to give a TDM example
Hipparcos (a geostationary spacecraft) has a continuous
data rate of 23 kbits/s but produces one subframe each c.
10s. The loading of the Hipparcos Dedicated Computer
System (HDCS) is comparable to that of the EDCS
(possibly a little lower) despite the Hipparcos's much higher
bit rate. Similar as for the ground system the on-board
system must be carefully analysed and a software system
budget should establish a clear reference case for on-board
and space to ground traffic scenario, which can be
used for system testing. Critical on-board areas are
computer load, timing of cooperation or dependant
applications, packet buffer sizes and number of
packet buffers.
Data delivery to users is greatly facilitated by use of
packet telemetry, which already results in
decommutation according to application ID. This also
simplifies the provision of security, i,e. protection of
privacy of datasets. Eureca users require rapid access
to their data, which rules out the traditional method
science data delivery, dispatch on magnetic tapes.
The COP- 1protocol increases the complication of the
command uplinker software, which has to handle for
every telecommand with a number of messages
coming from different units at the station in addition
to the telemetry messages from the spacecraft.
Testing this software in a realistic environment
became absolutely necessary due to the importance of
the timing aspects of the problem and this forced
extension of precious testing time with the spacecraft
flight model connected to a ground station interface.
4. THE ON-BOARD SYSTEM
The large number of independent processors on-board
EURECA increases the likelihood of unexpectod
behaviours which result in corruption of the format or
contents of the Telemetry Packet produced. During
the mission a number of problems were identified
with the on-board implementation resulting in very
strange anomalous behaviours. Many of these
problems directly violated basic assumptions for the
design of the ground segment adding to the strange
behaviour. Below is a table listing the problems
experienced during the mission:
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Problem
Received a corrupted Transfer
Frame (already corrupted before
the FECW was calculated)
The problem was with a spillover
with Idle Frames between.
When the on-board Data Handling
System changes mode from High
Speed Link to Low Speed Link it
cannot maintain the Transfer
Frames proper (spillover etc.)
Consequence
Ground system reported protocol
an protocol error because the
expected spillover data were not
available.
Packet Discarded
As above
On-Ground Detection
Always use the First Header Pointer
in the Transfer Frame Header as the
Master to locate the f'trst Packet in
a Frame. If inconsistent with the
Packet Length from the last Packet
in the previous Frame discard this
Packet and report a protocol error.
As above
Prevention
Ground Testing
Spacecraft Design.
Received a Transfer Frame with Allowed according to the Do not assume that an Idle-Packet
two Idle Packets and with a non- standard, always is at the end of a Transfer
idle packet between. Frame.
PRIMARY HEADERS
Problem Consequence On-Ground Detection Prevention
Ground testing.Received Packets where the
Secondary Header Flag was set to
1 but the Packet Length Field had
the value 0 (SH is fixed to 6
octets for EURECA)
In one experiment the Source
Sequence Counter is implemented
as a 16 Bit Counter instead of the
14 Bit defined in the standard.
In one experiment the Source
Sequence Counter is shared
between four different Application
IDs.
Ground system detected a
corrupted packet reported a
protocol error.
Time calibration not possible.
Ground system reported
segmentation protocol errors
because the SSC has been
extended into the Segmentation
Flags in the Primary Header.
Packet discarded.
Ground system reports jumps in
Source Sequence Counter.
Accounting for these Application
IDs not possible.
Maintain a list of allowed length of
each Application ID and check
every received Packet.
Check consistency between the
information in the Primary Header
and the Packet Length.
Check the value of the P field in
the Secondary Header if the P field
is used.
Normally build into the packet
deeommutation algorithm.
Normally build into the packet
decommutation algorithm.
Ground testing shall
check that all
instruments handles
correctly the wraparound
of the SSC. This require
normally a long test run.
workaround: Restart
experiment at regular
interval.
Ground testing.
:)
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Problem Consequence On-Ground Detection Prevention
General: to the
Due to onboard power/cooling
constraints it is necessary to
activate/deactivate instruments
frequently. In such cases the
experiments resets the Source
Sequence Counter to O.
Allowed according
standard
The Source Sequence Counter is
not very useful in these cases. The
ground design must take into
account such type of operations
SECONDARY HEADERS AND TIME CALIBRATION
Problem Consequence On-Ground Detection Prevention
Secondary Headers Proper time calibration cannot be Ground testing
:!
Received
where the Time Field was shifted
one uetet.
performed.
Many experiments have problems
with the stability of their local
clocks resulting in:
Unacceptable drift
Large jumps in time when they
synchronize with the Master
Clock. This can even cause the
time to jump backwards.
Proper time calibration cannot
always be performed.
In case the time jumps
backwards this may cause
problems for the filing system.
However this depends on the
design of the filing system.
May be difficult. For real-time
received telemetry it is possible to
make a plausibility check against
current time. However this does not
work for playback of on-board
stored Telemetry. In the playback
case another plausibility cheeks
must be implemented.
As above. Design of the overall
time concept including
requirements on drifts of
master and local clocks.
During ground testing
verify that the
implementation is
according to
specification.
/
/
. OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH
PACKET TM/TC
One of the main advantages of packet Tm is that the TM
sourcE can in principle decide what data to send when to
the ground. This concept was extensively applied on
EURECA, and the ground segment and operations concept
used it as a basic assumption. While this proved to work
well in the nominal cases, it became a problem in cases of
on-board failures. In some cases the on-board unit which
experienced that failure took the wrong decision on what
TM to send, limiting the visibility to the ground of the
causes of the failure. Some failures affected the
functionality of the unit to the extent that the unit stopped
generating TM or even started an endless loop in which
event TM packets were generated continuously,
overflowing the on-board d ata storage. Interaction between
the subsystem TM generation and the system level
decisions taken by DHS in case of specific failures were
also very difficult to handle. In the case of AOCS special
application software had to be written within DHS to
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guarantee extended TM generation in case of
subsystem anomalies. This did not succeed in several
cases during the flight, and the correct TM coverage
of critical failures was lost as a consequence.
The implementation of the packet TM concept had a
major positive effect on the on-board communications
between "intelligent" instruments and subsystems and
the central DHS over the DHS data bus, Low level
protocol problems in the bus interface units were often
cured at higher level by the packet transfer protocol.
Those units which were not able to generate packets
suffered from the low level problems, causing
significant complications to the operations. One
negative aspect of the EURECA implementation of
packet TM was that the DHS application software was
not able to read the contents of the TM packets
generated by the other subsystems or instruments. This
artificially limited enormously the system level fault
management capabilities of the DHS. In particular the
information contained in the Housekeeping packets
and the Event packets (Report and Exception) was
essential to detect and isolate problems with the subsystem
or instrument which could be easily recovered at system
level. This limitation of the DHS shifted the system level
fault management to the ground control, which was in
most of the cases only able to intervene after several
hours, due to the limited visibility of the spacecraft from
the ground stations (about 5% of the mission time).
The use of the different packet types by the different
packet TM sources on -board (12 instruments and 2
subsystems) was not always correctly reflecting the
definitions imposed by the design specifications. In
particular an improper use of Report and Exception
packets was causing some problems in flight operations.
The ground segment was designed under the assumption
that Exception packets would only report anomalous
behaviours, and Report packets would indicate progress or
completion of nominal activities; in several cases it was
found out during final system testing or even during flight
that this clear distinction was not always observed.
Another clear directive for the design of TM packets was
that all TM parameters for which direct ground monitoring
was required should have been included in Housekeeping
packets. The ground segment was designed on this
assumption and therefore was not supposed to open and
process science packets. This rule was also in several cases
not properly followed and the ground had to work around
the problem by including some specific science packets in
the list of TM packets to be processed. This was not trivial
also due to the fact that no formal documentation was
available to describe science packets, and the relevant
information had to be extracted from various sources like
meetings, private conversations and informal documents.
The packet TM implementation had a significant impact on
the operational database preparation. Most of the TM
parameters were contained in several different
Housekeeping packets; this had an impact on the size of
database tables and complicated the handling of derived
parameters, which had to be defmed and inserted in all
TM packets containing a contributing parameters. A large
amount of manpower had to be invested in the generation
of the Event packets database. This was mainly caused by
the large number of possible event packets (of the order of
2500 at the end) to be defined, but also to the lack of
description of these packets in the A1T database. The
contents description and meaning of each event packet had
to be extracted in most of the cases directly from the on-
board software code which was generating it. This manual
ork had to be repeated every time a new version of the
application software was generated and copied to ESOC,
even after launch.
Event packets were the most powerful tool the flight
controllers had to monitor the spacecraft and payload
activities and to identify and diagnose anomalies. The
lack of A1T database in this area reduced significantly
the quality of the overall ground testing.
A final consideration should be made on the
opportunity to involve flight operations personnel in
the defmition of the contents of Housekeeping packets.
These packets were originally designed following
engineering considerations and disregarding
completely the utilisation during operations. This
forced a complete redesign of the packets at a later
stage in the development of the spacecraft, with
impact on both the A1T/AIV programme and the
operations preparation.
For commanding no real problems was encountered
during flight with this concept, Its flexibility was
properly exploited by the database editors specially
designed for this mission in the mission control
system. The block protocol and the related retry
mechanism in case of failed uplink verification of a
TC block worked very well, but were very difficult to
test and tune before flight.
6. LESSONS LEARNED
The following lessons have been learned about packet
telemetry and telecommand systems from development
of the Eureca spacecraft control system and during the
mission:
. Sizing of ground and on-board computer
systems needs to be carried out carefully,
using a good traffic model for the generation
of the various packets.
. Very careful consideration has to be given to
matching the design of the spacecraft and
packet control system to the characteristics of
packet telemetry. "Fudging "a TDM system
work with packet telemetry is not advised
and at the best is likely to be highly
inefficient
. On-Ground Testing must take into account
the use of Packet Telemetry. This must
include functional tests to verify 1) all
implemented features of the Packet Telemetry
(segmentation etc.), 2) proper wraparound of
counters, 3) stability of on-board clocks
(master and slave), 4) performance tests to
verify on-bard loading of the system in
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typical operational scenarios.
Ground system must be able to handle errors in
the implementation of packet telemetry 1) check
the consistency of all static fields in transfer
frames and packets, 2) design the system to be
robust against implementation errors, 3) design
the system to minimise the impact on other users
in case of implementation errors, 4) include
knowledge of the on-board implementation
(expected application id's,expected packet lengths
etc.), 5) provide proper reporting for detected
errors, 6) give operational staff proper visibility
of detected errors, 6) provide tools to disable
error reporting of "known errors"
.
software patches and master schedules) and
provide elements that makes it possible to
recover in case of ground failures.
Introduction of Packet Telemetry and
Commands is a major step towards
standardisation of on-board and ground
systems. In order to fully archive this goal it
will be necessary to define standards
covering more of the format than that
specified in present standards. At the very
least local standards are needed for each
packet type to avoid proliferation. Ref 7
describes some current ESA work on this
topic.
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The COP-1 protocol has proven to be very
reliable and is able to recover transmission error
with minimal operational impact. There have been
a number of occasion where the COP-1 protocol
has successfully recovered an error. These cases
all concerns link degradation, and involved the
following circumstances:
Dining the deployment phase with a bad
RF link between the Shuttle and
EURECA
During the deployment phase where the
EDCS did not receive a Command
Acceptance Pattern (CAP) from NASA.
During ESA ground station passes where
the spacecraft was configured with the
wrong antennae.
During ESA ground passes where
commanding was executed down to 0°
elevation (resulting in degradation of the
telecommand and telemetry links).
DtLdng on-board antenna switch over.
When the OBC failed to allocate a
telecommand buffer (due to an OBC
overload condition).
Although not all of the above cases were foreseen
in the design of the COP-1 protocol (in particular
case 2 and 6) the COP-1 protocol has always
successfully recovered the error with a maximtun
of two retries. It is also important that during
EURECA routine operations with a normal link
budget the COP-1 protocol has never been in
retry (i.e no transmission errors).
The design of the commanding system in the
control centre must consider end-to-end protocols
(in particular needed for uplinking on-board
7. CONCLUSION
The packet TM/TC concept proved very powerful in
supporting complex operations of an autonomous low-
Earth orbiter like EURECA. The system supported a
heavy dowulink and uplink traffic corresponding to a
total of 10 million transfer frames containing 35
million packets and 240000 commands were send.
Most of the above described problems do not relate to
the overall concept but to the implementation, which
suffered in the EURECA mission from the lack of
previous experience. We have found a number of
problems with the actual implementation of the Packet
Telemetry Standard but we have not found any
problems with the standard itself.
The lessons learned form this mission could be easily
taken into consideration in the design of future
missions applying the same approach to the space-
ground interface.
.
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